ginmar: How to lose a war in a few easy steps: The tactics for winning a war and winning a peace are entirely two different processes. To win a war one has to have several objectives while observing other standards. The primary goal is to defeat the enemy. Why that enemy is one's enemy is a question that sometimes is self-evident. In the case of Saddam Hussein and the invasion of Iraq, it was not. Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden, for example, could not have any real hope of cooperation. Iraq was a secular society where women could drive, vote, choose to veil or not, and so forth. Bin Laden's vision of society is a theocratic one, much like that of religious extremists in the US. In both visions of this religious Utopia, control of women remains the primary objective and symptom.
Saddam Hussein was a garden variety dictator. Whether this was because he had no ability or inclination remains unknown. He did all the usual things a dictator does; he killed thousands of his own countrymen, tortured and murdered people, and yet he granted them some freedoms not common in the Middle East. Because he refused to restrict women more than he did men, he was viewed with disdain and hatred by more conservative Muslims---or, rather, those people who call themselves Muslims, while living none of its principles. "Let the veil of modesty by on mens' eyes," says the Koran. That requires men to be modest in their desires and their observations of women. Some people in the West cannot grasp this concept. Some people in the Middle East can.
Saddam Hussein was a Sunni Muslim while the majority of his subjects were Shi'ite. Their religious freedoms---the observation of Ashu'ura, for example----were restricted. Iraq also contained many tribes, which to a certain extent trump politics. Tribal loyalty may or may not over-ride other concerns. Think of those conservatives here in the US who claim explicitly or not that the law does not apply to them because they're special or morally correct. This can or cannot happen with tribal loyalty. In good times, the tribe is a background. In bad times, it becomes all the security one might have. Some of the tribes in Iraq contain upward of 2,000 male members. Arm them and you have a regiment---and everyone in Iraq has an AK-47.
Hussein's desire for a secular society also served to keep the mullahs muzzled. The moderates suffered perhaps the most while the extremists nourished their frustration in seething silence. Muqtada Sadr's father Muhammed Sadiq al-Sadr was a rather moderate erudite man who wrote about jurisprudence, among other topics. I've also heard that he wrote about Islamic principles applied to economics. In a dictatorship, moderation and logic can be the real enemies. Saddam had him killed in 1999, and picked off the other members of his family one by one, leaving only Muqtada and his brother Mortada. Reportedly the two brothers despise each other.
Muqtada Sadr was a mediocre student who appeared to have little interest in studying. Suddenly, though, in the anarchy that followed the 2003 invasion he saw an opportunity and recreated himself as a devout Muslim. One gets the sense that he had his father were not fond of one another, but that did not stop him from exploiting his father's name---while he has consistantly employed Saddam Hussein's methods. He is far more conservative and reactionary than is the Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, the Iranian cleric who is the highest-ranking Shi-ite in Iraq. Sadr's men have formed Sharia courts in southern Iraq and have passed sentences and performed executions. Amongst the victims which I personally know of were an unmarried pregnant woman and her four-year old child. The mother was executed in the street with three shots while her child watched. Then the little boy's throat was cut. It takes a fairly long time to die that way. One wonders what his moderate father would think of such things. One knows what Sistani thinks of it: reportedly Sadr was summoned to Sistani's presence in hte fall of 04 and reamed out for visiting such destruction on the Iraqi people.
What does this have to do with war? This is what happens when there is no plan for what follows a war, even a successful one. The tribal structure of Iraq complicates matters to an amazing degree, and it's apparent that this was not factored in when plans were made. The tribes took control of their regions eagerly as they had not been able to do when Saddam was in power. In the vacuum created by Saddam's ouster, this control felt like management.
In war, one wishes to defeat the enemy, causes as few civilian casualties as possible, preserve the lives and welfare of one's soldiers, and move on. One wishes this to be a fast process, and to cost as little as possible. Keep in mind that civilian casualties are inevitable in war, especially if there is a different culture and language to deal with.
To win a peace is very different. To win a peace requires that one study the country and culture at some length and know its political players with some certainty. While Sadr's rise to prominence might not have been predicted, some attention should have been paid to the country's tribal affiliations. As stated earlier, with the country in disarray, the tribes provided structure and organization.
Most critically, maintaing a peace after a war becomes something extremely complicated in a tribal society. In a Muslim tribal society, divided between Sunnis and Shi'ites that has been invaded by a largly Christian country the need for delicacy over rides all others. When one can observe US MPs subduing suspects by placing their feet on them, one can only realize that not enough training was done prior to invasion.
Iraq was moderate and secular: its neighbors most definitely are not. They watched and observed, and saw that the borders were unguarded. They exploited that. From within, the tribal chieftains did the same thing. There are rumors that some tribes are entirely devoted to the insurgency and that some regions are controlled by those same chieftains.
To win the peace, we should have promptly increased troop strength by about two hundred thousand to adequately secure the borders and restore order. The Iraqi Army was dissolved upon Baghdad's fall for fear of Republican Guards in it, yet this promptly causes the unemployment of thousands who had joined the RG because it was compulsory. With no money and no future, these souls looked for options. We did not offer any; the insurgents did.
The first and most important error was the lack of sufficent troops. Without enough troops, the country was not secure or safe, and this has increased exponentially. We cannot guard the border; we cannot patrol enough streets and highways. We cannot hear every grievance, much less fix them. The insurgents kill at least one US soldier per day, and at least a couple Iraqi civilians for every soldier.
Prior to the war, civilians enjoyed relative safety. Please note the use of the word relative. Hussein could and did seize people and his sons were notorious for their raping and murdering. The mass graves have been over-reported: the one in Hilla last year contained four hundred bodies. Against that one has to contrast the effects of the bomb in Hilla in February of this year: 125 people died. Do good intentions make these people any less dead?
After a war, there can be a sense among the general population that everything has changed and no one is in charge. It is imperative that the population know that the foundation of their lives has not changed, and that there are people in charge who have actual power to accomplish things. You patrol the streets, you seal the borders, you get the infrastructure up and running again. You keep the population safe and you let them know that things will be better and that, most of all, the war is over.
Instead the war continues. Iraq's highways are lined with bombs and the craters from their explosions. Its buildings are marked with bullet holes and structural damage caused by bombs. In Baghdad, the violence is unending: westerners cannot venture outof their homes without heavy security. In the larger cities, women are beng threatened and harassed if they do not adopt the veil. Old scores are being settled as civilians regularly turn in their enemies to the authorities for various crimes.
If we could go back in time, we would have a quarter million more troops flood the country after Baghdad's fall, to line the border and secure the museums, the palaces, the bases, and the weapons. No ammo depot in the country would have been unguarded. No admittance to the country without proper documentation would have been allowed. The Army would not have been dissovled, but this time we would have enough personnel to find out who was Saddam's man and who joined the organization because they had to. By cutting off entrance to the country's interior the subsequent exploitation of its unguarded weapons, and by denying it the pool of disgruntled unemployed individuals created by the the dissolution of the Army, we would have started out the peace with a ready-made security force that faced exactly...what? It's easy to overestimate positive responses but the fact is that the Iraqis could not be more hostile in our hypothetical situation than they are. Keep in mind that the Iraqis are some of the nicest people in the world. To arouse their ire is a dubious distinction.
Without security you can accomplish nothing. Security cannot be provided without certain numbers of troops. Therefore you must establish security first. Otherwise you tread water, and the water is heavily mined.
We could still turn the sitution around in Iraq if we had enough troops, but the thing to be kept in mind is that we created this situation, we must fix it, and we cannot do it with the numbers we currently have---or don't have. Putting those boots on the ground, however, would mean admitting to any number of fallacies. Some people think that is too high a price to pay.
Perhaps those people should have a nice long chat with Cindy Sheehan and re-assess their concept of the price one pays for war.