Early Warning by William M. Arkin - washingtonpost.com
: Pentagon Fails on Roadside Bombs:The roadside bomb threat in Iraq made national news last weekend when an IED seriously injured ABC News anchor Bob Woodruff and cameraman Doug Vogt while they were embedded with the U.S. military. Since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003, according to the Defense Department, 51 percent of 1,735 combat deaths and two-thirds of 16,500 injuries are due to roadside bombs.
Some in the military are grousing about wall to wall coverage of Woodruff and Vogt, and the suggestion that "press folks are more important than mere military folks." What soldiers need to understand is that not only were Woodruff and Vogt in Iraq to report on those very folks, but if they have anger and frustration about the threats in Iraq, they should focus their ire on the Pentagon and the bureaucracy and not on the media.
The Pentagon's inability to competently deliver help to soldiers in the field is partly due to its insane propensity to create ad hoc organizations to address a problem and then constantly reorganize at the drop of a hat.... In December, Rumsfeld appointed retired Army Gen. Montgomery Meigs to head the Pentagon's efforts to deal with the problem, essentially firing the one star running the program and admitting that a number of diffuse and uncoordinated efforts had failed to produce either the technology or the tactics to protect American servicemembers. Meigs oversees a growing IED organization and over $1 billion committed for counter-IED initiatives. If there is one thing the Pentagon knows how to do, it is throw money at a problem, particularly one that suggests a technology solution.
But it also knows how to play with blocs, organizational blocs that is. Consider this: In October 2003, the Army created the Improvised Explosive Device Task Force (IED-TF) in recognition of the threat. In February 2004, the Army further directed the IED-TF be made a standing capability with assigned field teams. In April 2004, the Army proposed activation of an Asymmetric Warfare Regiment (later designated the Asymmetric Warfare Group) to oversee IED response and counter-terrorism priorities. In July 2004, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz redesignates the Army Task Force the Joint IED Defeat Task Force (JIEDD-TF), again assigning it the mission of providing streamlined and timely support to soldiers in the field. In July 2004, DOD establishes a Joint Integrated Process Team for Defeating Improvised
Explosive Devices (Joint IED Defeat IPT) to sharpen DoD focus on IEDs. In June 2005, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld signed a directive (DOD Directive 2000.19, Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat) designating DOD resources and direction to the problem. In January 2006, Meigs' JIEDD-TF is again redesignated as the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) and is made a permanent task force.
What has all this produced to stop IEDs? I guess a lot of old letterhead and not much action.
So it should be no surprise that in October 2004, when the Army published interim Field Manual 3-07.22, "Counterinsurgency Operations," the new doctrine only mentioned IEDs as a peripheral threat and made no mention whatsoever of potential IED campaigns employed by an adversary such as in Iraq. The new doctrine establish no doctrine for countering such campaigns.
No wonder that this week Republican and military stalwart Rep. Hunter now says "we need to focus more effort" on the IED problem and threat.
The President may declare that we are "winning" in Iraq, but on the ground, happy talk about progress masks an unchanging if not even growing threat.
Of course none of this would be the epidemic that it is if the Defense Secretary and his department had recognized from the beginning that Iraq not only was chock-a-block filled with munitions but also that more troops were needed to ensure security after vanquishing the Iraqi Army.
My point is not to go over old territory, but to lament the clear contradiction evident in wild reorganization and the writing of check for over $1 billion to solve the problem: We are winning? Not only aren't we, but I have little confidence that this Pentagon leadership can even do what is needed to minimally protect American and Iraqi lives.